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Abstract
We consider a bilateral trade model in which both players have a finite number of possible
valuations. The seller’s valuation and the buyer’s valuation for the object are private informa-
tion, but the independent beliefs about these valuations are common knowledge. In this setting,
we provide a characterization of the set of interim individually rational-implementable trading
rules, analogous to the result of Myerson and Satterthwaite [1983]. Thereafter, we derive nec-
essary conditions for incentive compatible and ex post individually rational direct mechanisms.
For the special class of corner mechanisms with discrete uniform beliefs, we characterize the set
of ex post individually rational-implementable trading rules. In this context it is also shown
that ex post efficiency can only be achieved if the number of different valuations is small. The
maximal number of different valuations for which efficiency is still possible depends on the prior
probability distribution of valuations.
1 Introduction
A fundamental problem in economics is the bilateral trade problem. Distinctive for bilateral trade
is that we have just one seller who wants to trade one single indivisible object with only one
potential buyer. The main issue with this problem is asymmetric information; each trader’s own
valuation is private information, and thus there are incentives to misreport this private information.
Myerson and Satterthwaite [1983] showed that if we want both players to report truthfully, to be
always willing to participate and to have no outside party who is willing to subsidize, then there
is no bargaining mechanism that is ex post efficient. One of their assumptions however is that
we have a continuum of types for each player. There is however no modeling reason to prefer a
continuous type space to a discrete one [Vohra, 2011]. In some applications, people reason with
a limited amount of possible valuations. Think, for example, about monetary transactions. We
will therefore consider a bilateral trade model in which each player has a finite number of possible
valuations. This enables us to derive a more intuitive explanation of some of the classical results
on the bilateral trade model.
One other drawback in the analysis of Myerson and Satterthwaite [1983] is that they only
consider interim individual rationality, meaning that each player’s expected utility conditional on
his type needs to be nonnegative. This does not rule out the situation in which, for example, a
certain type of buyer is required to make a payment without trade taking place. In most markets
∗Address: Department of Quantitative Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maas-
tricht, The Netherlands. Email: m.schroeder@maastrichtuniversity.nl, j.flesch@maastrichtuniversity.nl,
d.vermeulen@maastrichtuniversity.nl
1
this does not occur, since ex post enforcement of payment is usually not feasible when the terms
of trade lead to loss of utility. Therefore we investigate the stronger property of ex post individual
rationality. Gresik [1991a] shows that for a general set of beliefs there exists an ex post individually
rational mechanism that generates the same level of ex ante expected gains from trade as the
interim individual rational mechanism that maximizes the ex ante expected gains from trade. We
have the more ambitious goal to characterize all trading rules that are ex post individually rational-
implementable. This goal is achieved for the special class of corner mechanisms when considering
discrete uniform beliefs. This class consists of fairly simple mechanisms and despite this simple
structure, it is still quite difficult to provide the full characterization. In general, we derive several
necessary conditions for a mechanism that satisfy incentive compatibility and ex post individual
rationality.
We also use our discrete bilateral trading model as a tool to do a robustness check for the
continuous model. We compare the continuous model of Myerson and Satterthwaite [1983] with
our discrete version to detect significant differences. There exists a modest discretisation effect
when considering ex post efficiency. For some beliefs it is actually possible to achieve efficiency
when considering a small number of different valuations, contrary to the result in the continuous
case. Matsuo [1989] presents a necessary and sufficient condition for ex post efficient mechanisms
to be feasible in the setting where both players have two types. Gresik [1991b] also analyzes the
situation of two types. However in his paper it is allowed to have beliefs that are statistically
dependent. He derives a necessary and sufficient condition for ex post efficient trade to be feasible.
Our goal is to investigate what happens to efficiency if we have any finite number of independent
types for each player. We show that in this setting ex post efficiency is usually not attainable.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Incentive com-
patibility and individual rationality are introduced in Section 3 and 4, respectively. The main
derivations and results can be found in Section 5 and 6. Section 7 discusses, among others, ex post
efficiency. Most of the proofs can be found in the Appendix.
2 The model
Consider the following discrete bilateral trade model in which two players bargain under incomplete
information. One player is the seller currently owning an indivisible object and the other player
is the buyer, who is potentially willing to buy the object for a certain amount of money. Each
player has m + 1 different possible valuations, namely: 0, 1, 2, . . . ,m and for each player one of
these valuations is drawn independently with a probability mass function fi(·) > 0 for i = s, b. For
each fi(·), we have a corresponding cumulative distribution function Fi(·).
Remark. Note that we could normalize our valuations such that all valuations are in between 0
and 1 (by division by m). By doing this, it becomes clear that an increase in m corresponds to a
more precise approximation of the continuous case. Indeed, if we take the limit of m to infinity we
obtain the continuous model.
Let vs represent the valuation of the seller for the object and vb represent the valuation of the
buyer. Both are private information of the player. These two players are then going to participate
in a bargaining mechanism. This mechanism determines whether there is going to be trade and for
which price. We assume that each player learns his own valuation and that the prior probabilities
of the player’s valuations are common knowledge.
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A direct bargaining mechanism is a mechanism in which each player simultaneously reports a
valuation to a coordinator. The coordinator will then determine whether the object is traded and
what the transfer will be. So each mechanism consists of three outcome matrices q, t+ and t− of
size (m+1)×(m+1): here qrs,rb ∈ [0, 1] is the probability that the object is traded, t+rs,rb ∈ R is the
transfer of the buyer to the seller if there is trade and t−rs,rb ∈ R is the transfer of the buyer to the
seller without trade, given that rs and rb respectively are the reported valuations. We refer to q as
the trading rule and to (t+, t−) as the transfer scheme. Define trs,rb = qrs,rb · t+rs,rb +(1−qrs,rb) · t−rs,rb
for every rs and rb, to represent the expected transfer given the reported valuations rs and rb. Most
of our results specify conditions for t. In those cases the actual choice of t+ and t− is not relevant,
any choice of t+ and t− resulting in t is then feasible.
A direct mechanism is deterministic if qrs,rb ∈ {0, 1} for every rs and rb. In these mechanisms
there is no need to make a distinction between the two different transfer matrices and thus we can
solely concentrate on t. These are the type of mechanisms considered in the papers of Myerson
and Satterthwaite [1983] and Gresik [1991a]. We, on the other hand, allow for uncertainty after
the players reported their valuations. So in our analysis it is allowed to have a probabilistic
mechanism in which 0 < qrs,rb < 1 for some rs and rb. For these mechanisms the distinction of the
transfer matrices is useful in order to compare different notions of individual rationality. Financial
derivatives are typical examples of commodities that exhibit this type of additional uncertainty.
In order for each player to be willing to participate in the bargaining mechanism, we need
the mechanism to satisfy individual rationality. However, there exist several standard notions of
individual rationality, namely ex ante, interim and ex post. Ex ante individual rationality requires
that players commit to the trading mechanism before they learn their type, but do know the rules
of the mechanism and the distribution of types of both players. Interim individual rationality
is stronger and allows a player to drop out after learning his own type, but before he reports
to the coordinator. Ex post individual rationality requires that even after both players reported
their valuation, every player is still willing to participate. The strongest version is strong ex post
individual rationality, which requires that money only transfers if the object is actually being traded
with an amount in between both players’ valuations.
A direct mechanism is (Bayesian) incentive compatible if honest reporting forms a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium. This means that, in equilibrium, no type of player has an incentive to misreport
to another type and thus it is optimal to report truthfully, given that the other player is expected
to report truthfully. We analyze Bayesian incentive compatibility, as Hagerty and Rogerson [1987]
showed that any mechanism satisfying dominant strategy incentive compatibility and ex post in-
dividual rationality is a posted-price mechanism. But this kind of mechanisms does not contain
much flexibility and is too restrictive.
Without any loss of generality, it is possible to concentrate on direct mechanisms due to the
revelation principle. This principle says that for any Bayesian equilibrium in any bargaining game,
there exists an equivalent direct mechanism yielding the same outcome (both an equivalent al-
location and payment) in which truthful reporting is a dominant strategy. Accordingly, we can
reconstruct any equilibrium by the use of a direct mechanism.
In order to define the players’ expected utilities for a given direct mechanism (q, t+, t−), first
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let
t¯s (rs) =
m∑
vb=0
trs,vb · fb (vb) q¯s (rs) =
m∑
vb=0
qrs,vb · fb (vb)
t¯b (rb) =
m∑
vs=0
tvs,rb · fs (vs) q¯b (rb) =
m∑
vs=0
qvs,rb · fs (vs)
All these quantities implicitly assume that the opponent reports truthfully. Here t¯i (ri) is the
expected transfer and q¯i (ri) is the expected probability of trade for player i = s, b, given that ri is
the reported valuation. Note that since we consider expected quantities here, it is allowed to solely
focus on t.
Then, given that the opponent reports truthfully, the expected utility of reporting ri when
having valuation vi (for i = s, b) is
Us (rs, vs) = t¯s (rs)− vs · q¯s (rs) and Ub (rb, vb) = vb · q¯b (rb)− t¯b (rb) .
To simplify notation, let the expected utility when reporting truthfully be denoted by Ui (vi) =
Ui (vi, vi).
3 Incentive compatibility
This section introduces the basic terminology and discusses preliminary results for incentive com-
patible mechanisms. We start with the definition of incentive compatibility.
Definition 3.1. A direct mechanism (q, t+, t−) is incentive compatible (IC) if
for all vs and rs Us (vs) ≥ Us (rs, vs) and
for all vb and rb Ub (vb) ≥ Ub (rb, vb) .
We call q implementable if there exists some (q, t+, t−) satisfying IC.
These inequalities assure that the expected utility does not increase when misreporting to
different valuations rs or rb respectively. In other words, these are the conditions under which
truthful reporting forms a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Definition 3.2. A direct mechanism (q, t+, t−) is weakly incentive compatible (WIC) if for i = s, b
Ui (0) ≥ Ui (1, 0)
Ui (m) ≥ Ui (m− 1,m)
Ui (vi) ≥ Ui (vi − 1, vi) for all vi = 1, . . . ,m− 1
Ui (vi) ≥ Ui (vi + 1, vi) for all vi = 1, . . . ,m− 1.
So if a mechanism satisfies WIC no player has an incentive to misreport to those valuations
adjacent to his own valuation. Clearly, any direct mechanism satisfying IC will also satisfy WIC.
The following lemma shows that the converse is also true.
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Lemma 3.3. A direct mechanism (q, t+, t−) satisfies IC if and only if it satisfies WIC.
The above result is useful since WIC is a property that is easier to check than IC, as we do not
need to compare utilities among all different possible reports.
Now we present necessary conditions for any IC mechanism. Analogous to the continuous case
of Myerson and Satterthwaite [1983], we show that the expected probability of trade, the expected
utility and the expected payment are all weakly monotone.
Lemma 3.4. Let the direct mechanism (q, t+, t−) be IC. Then
(a) the functions q¯s (·), Us (·) and t¯s (·) are all weakly decreasing
(b) the functions q¯b (·), Ub (·) and t¯b (·) are all weakly increasing.
Proof. Let (q, t+, t−) satisfy IC. By setting rs = vs+ 1 ≤ m in Lemma A.1 in the Appendix, we are
able to conclude from (9) that q¯s (vs + 1) ≤ q¯s (vs) and thus we find that q¯s (·) is weakly decreasing.
Furthermore, since q¯s (·) is nonnegative we can also conclude that Us (vs + 1) ≤ Us (vs) and hence
that Us (·) is weakly decreasing.
In order to prove that t¯s (·) is weakly decreasing, observe that IC implies that for vs < m
Us (vs)− Us (vs + 1, vs) = t¯s (vs)− vs · q¯s (vs)−
(
t¯s (vs + 1)− vs · q¯s (vs + 1)
)
= t¯s (vs)− t¯s (vs + 1) + vs ·
(
q¯s (vs + 1)− q¯s (vs)
)
≥ 0.
Since q¯s (vs + 1) ≤ q¯s (vs), the above inequality implies that t¯s (vs)− t¯s (vs + 1) ≥ 0 and thus that
t¯s (·) is weakly decreasing. The proofs for the buyer are analogous.
The above results are intuitive: the higher the valuation for the object of the seller, the less
he is willing to trade. This implies a lower expected probability of trade and consequently also a
lower revenue. Combined these last two statements result in a lower expected utility, as the effect
of the decrease in expected probability of trade dominates. Likewise for the buyer: the lower his
valuation, the less willing he is to acquire the object.
Given a direct mechanism (q, t+, t−), we define the following quantities:
ls =
m−1∑
vs=0
m−1∑
vi=vs
(
vi ·
(
q¯s (vi)− q¯s (vi + 1)
)
+m · q¯s (m)
)
· fs (vs) +m · q¯s (m) · fs(m)
us =
m−1∑
vs=0
m−1∑
vi=vs
(
(vi + 1) ·
(
q¯s (vi)− q¯s (vi + 1)
)
+m · q¯s (m)
)
· fs (vs) +m · q¯s (m) · fs(m)
lb =
m∑
vb=1
vb∑
vj=1
(vj − 1) ·
(
q¯b (vj)− q¯b (vj − 1)
)
· fb (vb)
ub =
m∑
vb=1
vb∑
vj=1
vj ·
(
q¯b (vj)− q¯b (vj − 1)
)
· fb (vb) .
Notice that if q is implementable, we know that ls ≤ us and lb ≤ ub due to the weak monotonicity
property on q¯s (·) and q¯b (·) shown in Lemma 3.4. This implies that any implementable trading rule
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q has two associated intervals, namely [ls, us] and [lb, ub]. These intervals will be used later on in
Subsection 5.2.
For the upcoming statement, assume that the cumulative distribution of the seller Fs(·) is
considered on the domain {−1, 0, 1, . . . ,m}. We include −1 in the domain for ease of exposition,
although this valuation always has a probability of 0.
Lemma 3.5.
ub − ls =
m∑
vs=0
m∑
vb=0
(
vb − 1− Fb (vb)
fb (vb)
− vs − Fs (vs − 1)
fs (vs)
)
· qvs,vb · fs (vs) · fb (vb) . (1)
Lemma 3.5 explains the relation between ub− ls and quantity (1) of Myerson and Satterthwaite
[1983] or quantity W (q) of Gresik [1991a]. This expression is important in the characterization
of the set of interim individually rational-implementable trading rules. Bulow and Roberts [1989]
already gave simple economic interpretations to the expressions
vb − 1− Fb (vb)
fb (vb)
and vs +
Fs (vs − 1)
fs (vs)
.
They show that the former can be interpreted as the marginal revenue of the buyer, and the latter
as the marginal cost of the seller. So ub− ls can be seen as the ex ante expected difference between
the marginal revenue and marginal cost of the two players.
Theorem 5.3 provides an interpretation of each of the quantities ls, us, lb and ub. Namely, under
the assumption that (q, t+, t−) is incentive compatibility and ex post individual rationality, these
quantities form lower and respectively upper bounds for the expected transfer in the mechanism.
So in fact, Lemma 3.5 gives a new interpretation to the above quantity: the difference between
the highest possible expected transfer in the mechanism from the buyer’s viewpoint and the lowest
possible expected transfer in the mechanism from the seller’s viewpoint, if the mechanism is incen-
tive compatible and ex post individually rational.
The following lemma is comparable to the first part of Theorem 1 of Myerson and Satterthwaite
[1983] and gives a lower and an upper bound for the sum of minimum expected utilities of both
players in any IC mechanism. As we know that Us (·) is weakly decreasing and Ub (·) is weakly
increasing for every IC mechanism by Lemma 3.4, we can deduce that Us (m) = min
vs
Us (vs) and
Ub (0) = min
vb
Ub (vb).
Lemma 3.6. Let the direct mechanism (q, t+, t−) satisfy IC. Then
lb − us ≤ Us (m) + Ub (0) ≤ ub − ls. (2)
4 Individual rationality
In this section we define several types of individual rationality in order of appearance on the
time line of the mechanism. Each type of individual rationality further down the time line of the
mechanism implies all earlier types of individual rationality. This order can also be deduced from
the amount of information each player acquires, because as the mechanism proceeds players obtain
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more information. A natural definition to start with is ex ante individual rationality, which requires
that each players’ expected utility in the mechanism, averaged over all possible valuations, must
be at least his expected utility without participation, which we assume to be zero. All of these
definitions assume that players report truthfully.
Definition 4.1. A direct mechanism (q, t+, t−) is ex ante individually rational (EAIR) if
m∑
vs=0
Us (vs) · fs (vs) ≥ 0 and
m∑
vb=0
Ub (vb) · fb (vb) ≥ 0.
This concept only makes sense for mechanisms in which a player must choose to participate
before he knows his own valuation for the object. However, we are more interested in stronger
versions of individual rationality as we assume that each player learns his own valuation. Let us
now state these definitions more formally.
Definition 4.2. A direct mechanism (q, t+, t−) is interim individually rational (IIR) if
Us (vs) ≥ 0 for all vs, and
Ub (vb) ≥ 0 for all vb.
We call q IIR-feasible if there exists a transfer scheme (t+, t−) such that the resulting mechanism
(q, t+, t−) satisfies IIR.
Observe that IIR implies EAIR. These inequalities assure that each player has a nonnegative
utility from participating in the mechanism after learning his valuation.
Definition 4.3. A direct mechanism (q, t+, t−) is ex post individually rational (EPIR) if for all
possible valuations vs and vb,
tvs,vb − vs · qvs,vb ≥ 0 and vb · qvs,vb − tvs,vb ≥ 0.
We call q EPIR-feasible if there exists a transfer scheme (t+, t−) such that the resulting mechanism
(q, t+, t−) satisfies EPIR.
Notice that EPIR implies IIR. These inequalities assure that if both players’ reports are public
information, each player’s expected payoff is nonnegative. A direct conclusion we can draw from
this is that the transfer will be in between both players’ valuations if there is trade with certainty,
i.e. vs ≤ t+vs,vb ≤ vb if qvs,vb = 1, and that there will be no transfer if the probability of trade is
zero, i.e. t−vs,vb = 0 if qvs,vb = 0.
In all of the previous definitions of individual rationality it was possible to only concentrate on
t since t can be seen as an expected payment after the players revealed their valuation, but before
it is actually known whether there is going to be trade or not. In the strongest version of individual
rationality, each player’s expected utility needs to be nonnegative no matter the actual realisation
of q, and as a result we need to impose restrictions on t+ and t− separately.
Definition 4.4. A mechanism (q, t+, t−) is strong ex post individually rational (SEPIR) if vs ≤
t+vs,vb ≤ vb whenever qvs,vb > 0 and t−vs,vb = 0 whenever qvs,vb < 1.
We call q SEPIR-feasible if there exists a transfer scheme (t+, t−) such that the resulting mechanism
(q, t+, t−) satisfies SEPIR.
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As a first observation notice that SEPIR implies EPIR. Secondly, as long as q is deterministic,
ex post individual rationality and strong ex post individual rationality are equivalent. However, if
0 < qvs,vb < 1 for some valuations vs and vb, the difference becomes apparent. In this situation a
lottery takes place after which trade occurs with a probability of qvs,vb . The inequalities of an EPIR
mechanism do not rule out the situation in which t−vs,vb 6= 0. In such a situation despite the negative
outcome of the lottery, there will be a transfer of money without any trade of the object. If this is
a payment of the buyer to the seller, the buyer has a negative utility from the trade. However, the
precise conditions of this gamble were clear to both of them in advance, and the expected utility
of this lottery for both players is nonnegative. For a SEPIR mechanism however, money transfers
without trade are not allowed to happen.
Luckily, it is always possible to create a SEPIR mechanism if the inequalities in Definition 4.3
of an EPIR mechanism are satisfied.
Proposition 4.5. If q is EPIR-feasible, then q is SEPIR-feasible.
Proof. Suppose that (q, t+, t−) is EPIR. We will define transfer scheme (t˜+, t˜−) in such a way that
t˜vs,vb = tvs,vb and (q, t˜
+, t˜−) satisfies SEPIR. If qvs,vb = 0 and qvs,vb = 1, let t˜vs,vb = tvs,vb . If
0 < qvs,vb < 1, then
t˜+vs,vb =
tvs,vb
qvs,vb
,
and t˜−vs,vb = 0. By the inequalities of Definition 4.3, (q, t˜
+, t˜−) is SEPIR.
Since our aim is to characterize implementable trading rules, we will only concentrate on the
EPIR conditions in the rest of the paper.
5 Necessary conditions for IC and EPIR mechanisms
This section first provides necessary and sufficient conditions for a trading rule q to be interim
individually rational-implementable. Thereafter, we derive necessary conditions for every incentive
compatible and ex post individually rational mechanism.
5.1 Characterization of IIR-implementable trading rules
A trading rule q is IIR-implementable, if there exists a (q, t+, t−) satisfying both IC and IIR
1. The following theorem provides a characterization of IIR-implementable trading rules. Our
characterization can be interpreted as a discrete version of Theorem 1 of Myerson and Satterthwaite
[1983].
Theorem 5.1. q is IIR-implementable if and only if q¯s(·) is weakly decreasing, q¯b(·) is weakly
increasing and
ls ≤ ub. (3)
1There is a subtlety here. We already defined implementability of a trading rule. We also defined IIR-feasibility of
a trading rule. However, the current definition forces us to use the same transfer rules t+ and t− in both definitions.
In effect this is a stronger requirement than simple implementability together with IIR-feasibility.
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5.2 Necessary conditions for IC and EPIR mechanisms
Now, we will derive necessary conditions for every EPIR-implementable trading rule. We will
obtain our first result using the sum of minimum expected utilities of both players. Let us call q
EPIR-implementable, if there exists a (q, t+, t−) satisfying both IC and EPIR.
Theorem 5.2. Suppose q is EPIR-implementable. Then
ls ≤ ub and lb ≤ us. (4)
Proof. Let (q, t+, t−) satisfy IC and EPIR. We know from Lemma 3.6 that
lb − us ≤ Us (m) + Ub (0) ≤ ub − ls,
whereas from Proposition A.2 in the appendix that
Us(m) = t¯s(m)−m · q¯s(m) = 0 and Ub(0) = −t¯b(0) = 0.
Combining them leads to (4).
The following theorem presents a different necessary condition, namely one for the expected
transfer in every IC and EPIR mechanism. This theorem is related to Lemma 3 of Gresik and
Satterthwaite [1983], where payments for any IC mechanism are defined in the continuous model.
Theorem 5.3. Let the direct mechanism (q, t+, t−) be IC and EPIR. Then
ls ≤
m∑
vs=0
m∑
vb=0
tvs,vb · fs (vs) · fb (vb) ≤ us and lb ≤
m∑
vs=0
m∑
vb=0
tvs,vb · fs (vs) · fb (vb) ≤ ub.
Proof. In this proof, we only show how to get
m∑
vs=0
m∑
vb=0
tvs,vb · fs (vs) · fb (vb) ≤ us.
All the other bounds can be derived using a similar method.
Let us construct the upper bound us by using the incentive compatibility constraints for different
valuations of the seller. For each seller with a valuation of vs + 1 for vs = 0, . . . ,m− 1, IC implies
t¯s (vs + 1)− (vs + 1) · q¯s (vs + 1) = Us (vs + 1)
≥ Us (vs, vs + 1) = t¯s (vs)− (vs + 1) · q¯s (vs) ,
which can be rewritten to
t¯s (vs)− t¯s (vs + 1) ≤ (vs + 1) ·
(
q¯s (vs)− q¯s (vs + 1)
)
.
By adding all these inequalities for vi = vs, . . . ,m− 1, we get
t¯s (vs)− t¯s (m) ≤
m−1∑
vi=vs
(vi + 1) ·
(
q¯s (vi)− q¯s (vi + 1)
)
.
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By property (d) of Proposition A.2 in the Appendix, we know that t¯s(m) = m · q¯s(m) and thus
t¯s (vs) ≤
m−1∑
vi=vs
(vi + 1) ·
(
q¯s (vi)− q¯s (vi + 1)
)
+m · q¯s(m). (5)
Remember, by definition
us =
m−1∑
vs=0
m−1∑
vi=vs
(
(vi + 1) ·
(
q¯s (vi)− q¯s (vi + 1)
)
+m · q¯s (m)
)
· fs (vs) +m · q¯s (m) · fs(m).
Adding the inequalities of (5) over all vs and weighting by fs (vs) yields
m∑
vs=0
m∑
vb=0
tvs,vb · fs (vs) · fb (vb) =
m∑
vs=0
t¯s (vs) · fs (vs) ≤ us.
This completes the proof.
The above theorem shows that ls, us, lb and ub are derived in a natural way by using the incentive
compatibility constraints combined with one of the properties of every ex post individually rational
mechanism.
Remember from Section 3 that any implementable trading rule has two associated intervals:
[ls, us] and [lb, ub]. Notice that Theorem 5.3 implies that the intersection of the intervals [ls, us]
and [lb, ub] should be nonempty: [ls, us] ∩ [lb, ub] 6= ∅, in order for the expected transfer of an IC
and EPIR mechanism to exist. Since any EPIR-feasible trading rule also satisfies IIR-feasibility,
Theorem 5.1 implies that ls ≤ ub. A consequence of these two observations is that lb ≤ us. Thus
Theorem 5.2 can be proven in two different ways: via the expected utilities of the players (as in
the proof of Theorem 5.2) or via the expected transfer in the mechanism (as in Theorem 5.3).
6 Deterministic and comprehensive trading rules
This section analyzes the class of deterministic and comprehensive trading rules. Let us first give
the formal definition.
Definition 6.1. A trading rule q is deterministic and comprehensive if for every vs and vb:
[1] qvs,vb ∈ {0, 1}, and
[2] qvs,vb = 1 implies that qvi,vj = 1 for all vi ≤ vs and all vj ≥ vb.
Recall that in a deterministic mechanism it is known whether there is going to be trade after
the reports are known to the coordinator. Remember that for these trading rules it is sufficient to
analyze t instead of transfer scheme (t+, t−).
A comprehensive mechanism is reasonable to consider, since it is a natural way to obtain the
monotonicity properties of the expected probability of trade: a weakly decreasing q¯s (·) and a weakly
increasing q¯b (·). As a result, we do not need to add monotonicity properties of q¯i(·) for i = s, b as
additional requirements in the following analysis.
10
6.1 Results related to IC+EPIR
The following theorem constructs a transfer t in such a way that money is only transferred in case
of trade. This does not mean, yet, that these transfers are necessarily in between both players’
valuations. Consequently, the resulting mechanism does not always satisfy EPIR.
Theorem 6.2. Let q be a deterministic and comprehensive trading rule such that ls ≤ ub and
lb ≤ us. Then, there exist a t such that (q, t+, t−) is IC and IIR, and moreover Us(m) = Ub(0) = 0
and tvs,vb = 0 if qvs,vb = 0 for all vs and vb.
Proof. Let us construct t such that (q, t+, t−) is IC and IIR with Us(m) = Ub(0) = 0 and tvs,vb = 0
if qvs,vb = 0 for all vs and vb. By Theorem 5.1, q is IIR-implementable. Accordingly, we know that
ls ≤ us and lb ≤ ub. Combined with the assumption that ls ≤ ub and lb ≤ us, it follows that there
exists a T such that ls ≤ T ≤ us and lb ≤ T ≤ ub. Let us define ∆s = T−lsus−ls if ls < us and ∆s = 0
otherwise and ∆b =
T−lb
ub−lb if lb < ub and ∆b = 0 otherwise. Then we set tvs,vb = 0 if qvs,vb = 0 and
[a] for vb = 1, . . . ,m: tm,vb = m · qm,vb
[b] for vs = 0, . . . ,m: tvs,0 = 0
[c] for vs = 1, . . . ,m− 1 and vb = 1, . . . ,m, if qvs,vb = 1:
tvs,vb =
m−1∑
vi=vs
(vi + ∆s) · (q¯s (vi)− q¯s (vi + 1)) +m · q¯s(m)
q¯s (vs)
[d] for vb = 1, . . . ,m, if q0,vb = 1:
t0,vb =
vb∑
vi=1
(vi − 1 + ∆b) · (q¯b (vi)− q¯b (vi − 1))−
m∑
vs=1
tvs,vb · fs (vs)
fs (0)
.
By construction, we know that tvs,vb = 0 if qvs,vb = 0 for all vs and vb. Cases [a] and [b] set prices
in such a way that Us(m) = Ub(0) = 0. Case [c] assures that prices are IC for the seller and case
[d] makes sure that prices are IC for the buyer. The proof of these statements is given in the
Appendix.
We proceed with an example of a deterministic and comprehensive trading rule q for which
ls ≤ ub and lb ≤ us, while q is not EPIR-implementable. So even if we restrict our trading rule to
the class of deterministic and comprehensive trading rules, the conditions ls ≤ ub and lb ≤ us are
not a sufficient condition for q to be an EPIR-implementable trading rule.
Example. Assume that valuations are discrete uniformly distributed, that is fi (vi) =
1
m+1 for
all valuations vi for i = s, b. Consider Trading rule 1. Let us show that it is not possible for
this mechanism to satisfy both IC and EPIR. Assume (q, t+, t−) is IC and EPIR. We derive a
contradiction. By the type of seller with valuation 0,
8∑
vb=5
t0,vb ≤ 11.
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11 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 0
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 0
8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 53 61
7 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 5
6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 5
5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 5
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Trading rule 1: The first column specifies the different valuations for each type of buyer, and the
last row specifies the different valuations for each type of seller. The inner matrix forms the trading
rule q. So each column in this matrix represents a type of seller and each row a type of buyer.
The first two rows specify the upper and lower bounds for the sum of prices for that specific type
of seller in the corresponding column. Similarly, the last two columns specify the upper and lower
bounds for the sum of prices for that specific type of buyer in the row. How to obtain these bounds
for the sum of prices for the seller? For the lower bound: sum the maximum value the seller could
have reported while still having trade, over all type of buyers he trades with. Whereas for the
upper bound we sum the minimum value that could be reported without having trade, over all
type of buyers he has trade with (which is equivalent to inequality (5)). For example, a seller
with a valuation of 1 only has trade with a buyer with valuation of 8. For this type of buyer,
the maximum valuation that the seller could have reported while still having trade is 7 and the
minimum reported valuation without having trade is 8.
By the types of buyers with valuations 5, 6 and 7,
7∑
vb=5
t0,vb ≥ 12.
Since t0,8 ≥ 0, we obtained a contradiction.
6.2 Corner mechanisms
In this and the following subsection it is assumed that the valuations are discrete uniformly dis-
tributed, that is fi (vi) =
1
m+1 for all valuations vi for i = s, b. Let us first present a lemma that
shows that we have a symmetric problem.
Lemma 6.3. 2 Let fi (vi) =
1
m+1 for all valuations vi for i = s, b and q be deterministic and
comprehensive. If q is EPIR-implementable, then qT is also EPIR-implementable.
This subsection considers a special class of deterministic and comprehensive mechanisms with
a simple structure, the so-called corner mechanisms, and gives a full characterization of all EPIR-
implementable trading rules contained in this class.
2We define qTvs,vb = qm−vb,m−vs
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Consider the following class of deterministic and comprehensive trading rules: q a corner mech-
anism if for k, ` ∈ N and k ≤ m and ` ≤ m, we have
m 1 1 . . . 1 0 . . . 0
m− 1 1 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
m− ` 1 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0
m− `− 1 0 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0
0 1 . . . k k + 1 . . . m
.
For instance, Trading rule 1 in Subsection 6.1 is a corner mechanism. Lemma A.3 in the Appendix
shows that there at most three different prices present in such mechanism if we assume IC and
EPIR. Moreover, the lemma presents necessary and sufficient conditions for these prices.
The following theorem presents necessary and sufficient conditions for a corner mechanism q
to be EPIR-implementable. With the addition of two constraints to the two known constraints,
ls ≤ ub and lb ≤ us from Theorem 5.2, we obtain a full characterization.
Theorem 6.4. Assume fi (vi) =
1
m+1 for all valuations vi for i = s, b and let q be a corner matrix.
Then q is EPIR-implementable if and only if ls ≤ ub, lb ≤ us, and whenever q1,m = q0,m−1 = 1:
m−1∑
vs=0
qvs,m −
m−1∑
vb=1
(2vb −m− 1) · q0,vb ≥ 0 (6)
and
m−1∑
vs=0
(m− 2vs − 1) · qvs,m −
m−1∑
vb=1
q0,vb − qm,m ≤ m. (7)
Proof. 3 First, observe that
m−1∑
vs=0
qvs,m −
m−1∑
vb=1
(2vb −m− 1) · q0,vb = `+ k + 1− qm,m − (m− `− 1 + q0,0) · `
and
m−1∑
vs=0
(m− 2vs − 1) · qvs,m −
m−1∑
vb=1
q0,vb − qm,m = m− `− 1 + q0,0 + k · (m− 1)− k · (k + 1− qm,m).
We prove the “only if” part. Assume q is EPIR-implementable. From Theorem 5.2 we know that
ls ≤ ub and lb ≤ us. We can deduce (6) by using lemma A.3:
0 ≤ z
= z + ` · y − x+ x− ` · y
≤ `+ k + 1− qm,m − (m− `− 1 + q0,0) · `,
3The proof uses the computational results from Subsection 6.3. Although all of these cases can also be checked
by hand.
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where the first inequality follows from (16) and the second inequality from the combination of (13),
(14) and (15). In a similar way, we can deduce (7):
m ≥ z
= z + k · x− y + y + k · x
≥ m− `− 1 + k · (m− 1)− k · (k + 1− qm,m),
where the first inequality follows from (16) and the second inequality from the combination of (12),
(14) and (15).
In order to complete the “if part” of the proof, suppose that ls ≤ ub, lb ≤ us and that inequalities
(6) and (7) hold. Because of the symmetry of the problem shown in Lemma 6.3, we only consider
all different possible values for k. The same analysis then also holds for l by using constraint (7).
The computational results of Subsection 6.3 show that for m < 8 all deterministic and compre-
hensive trading rules satisfying ls ≤ ub and lb ≤ us are EPIR-implementable and thus w.l.o.g. we
can assume that m ≥ 8.
Assume k = 0, then setting t0,m−`
m
= . . . = t0,1 =
m−`−1+q0,0
m results in a mechanism satisfying
IC and EPIR.
Now assume k = m, then we know from ls ≤ ub and symmetry that 0 < ` < m. From (6), we
can deduce that m+ ` ≥ (m− `−1) · `. In order to use Lemma A.3 of the Appendix, we distinguish
three cases:
1. if (m− `− 1) · ` ≤ m+ ` ≤ (m− `− 1) · (`+ 1).
Set x = m, y = m− `− 1 and z = m+ `− (m− `− 1) · `
2. if (m− `− 1) · (`+ 1) < m+ ` < (m− `) · (`+ 1).
Set x = m and y = z = m+``+1
3. if (m− `) · (`+ 1) ≤ m+ `.
Set x = m and y = z = m− `.
Notice for case 1 that 0 ≤ z ≤ m − ` − 1, for case 2 that m − ` − 1 < y = z < m − l and for case
3 that ub ≤ us in order to check that for all of these cases x, y and z satisfy the inequalities of
Lemma A.3 and thus generate a mechanism that satisfies IC and EPIR.
If k = m− 1, we only need to consider the cases 0 < ` < m due to symmetry and hence we can
distinguish the same three cases as above, with accompanying x, y and z.
For 0 < k ≤ m−2, we know due to symmetry that we only need to consider 0 < ` ≤ m−2, but
then ls ≤ ub and lb ≤ us assure that only two cases remain: k = m− 2 and ` = m− 2 or k = m− 3
and ` = m− 2. Setting x = z = k + 1 and y = m− `− 1 works for both cases.
Hence the addition of two extra constraints is sufficient to obtain the full characterization the set
of EPIR-implementable corner mechanisms. Furthermore, none of these constraints are redundant.
We describe those cases for which (6) is not redundant. Or to state it in different words, we describe
those cases for which all constraints are satisfied except (6). Because of symmetry, the same holds
for (7) by reversing k and `. Let k = m or k = m− 1. Then in the following situations (6) is not
redundant:
(a) if m = 8 and ` = 3
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(b) if m = 9 and 2 ≤ ` ≤ 5
(c) ifm ≥ 9 and m−2−
√
m2−8m+4
2 < ` ≤ m−3−
√
m2−10m+5
2 or
m−3+√m2−10m+5
2 ≤ ` < m−2+
√
m2−8m+4
2 .
However for m ≥ 11, there is only one integer value that actually lies within these bounds. Hence
there are not that many trading rules for which ls ≤ ub and lb ≤ us, while not satisfying the two
additional constraints. Most of the examples mentioned in Subsection 6.3 are of this kind.
6.3 Computational results
This subsection considers deterministic and comprehensive mechanisms with discrete uniformly
distributed valuations. In Subsection 6.1, we presented an example of a deterministic and compre-
hensive trading rule for with ls ≤ ub and lb ≤ us that is not implementable by an EPIR transfer
scheme. The program package Mathematica was used to find more of such examples. Let us first
show a short summary of the results obtained using Mathematica:
# valuations # det+compr #IIR #EPIR ls ≤ ub & lb ≤ us #examples
1 2 2 2 2 0
2 5 4 4 4 0
3 14 10 10 10 0
4 42 24 23 23 0
5 132 67 63 63 0
6 429 184 169 169 0
7 1430 541 493 493 0
8 4862 1580 1423 1423 0
9 16796 4785 4316 4320 4
10 58786 14496 12901 12919 18
11 208012 45209 39997 40029 32
The first column shows the number of different possible valuations for each player (which equals
m + 1 in our setting). The second column shows the amount of deterministic and comprehensive
trading rules q for each number of valuations. The third and fourth column represent the number
of implementable trading rules satisfying IIR-feasibility, and EPIR-feasibility respectively. The last
column illustrates the number of deterministic and comprehensive trading rules with ls ≤ ub and
lb ≤ us that cannot be implemented by an EPIR transfer scheme.
As long as the number of possible valuations is less than or equal to eight, all deterministic and
comprehensive trading rules satisfying ls ≤ ub, lb ≤ us are EPIR-implementable. So examples only
exist if each player has more than eight different possible valuations. However compared to the
total number of trading rules, the number of examples is relatively small.
Now that we have seen how to characterize trading rules for corner mechanisms, let us present
a different kind of example. Special for this trading rule is that quite some of the prices are fixed
due to the combination of IC and EPIR. These type of examples exist for m ≥ 9.
Example. 4 Consider Trading rule 2. Let us show that it is not possible for this mechanism to
satisfy IC and EPIR.
4All the examples we found using Mathematica are similar to the two examples discussed so far.
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21 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 9
17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 9
9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 68 78
8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 60 69
7 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 5
6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 5
5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 5
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Trading rule 2: The trading rule should be interpreted similar as Trading rule 1.
Assume (q, t+, t−) is IC and EPIR. We derive a contradiction. For vs = 1, . . . , 8, we know due
to EPIR that tvs,8 ≤ 8 and tvs,9 ≤ 9 and from the lower bound that tvs,8 + tvs,9 ≥ 17. This implies
that tvs,8 = 8 and tvs,9 = 9 for vs = 1, . . . , 8. Thus
9∑
vs=1
tvs,9 = 81.
However from the type of buyer with valuation 1, we know that
9∑
vs=0
tvs,9 ≤ 78.
Since t0,9 ≥ 0, we have a contradiction.
7 Other issues
7.1 Ex post efficiency
From a social point of view it is optimal to always have trade if the buyer values the object higher
and to never have trade if the seller values the object higher. This is called ex post efficiency.
Definition 7.1. A trading rule q is ex post efficient (EPE) if qvs,vb = 1 whenever vb > vs and
qvs,vb = 0 whenever vb < vs.
Clearly, for all EPE trading rules q¯s (·) is weakly decreasing and q¯b (·) is weakly increasing.
However, it is not specified what needs to be done in case of equal valuations. Therefore, we
analyze the two extreme cases: always and respectively never having trade if both valuations are
equal.
Theorem 7.2. Let q be EPE. If qvs,vb = 1 for all valuations vs = vb, then q is not IIR-implementable.
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Proof. Assume that q is EPE and that qvs,vb = 1 if vb = vs. In order to find out whether this q is
IIR-implementable, let us check inequality (3):
ub − ls
=
m∑
vs=0
m∑
vb=vs
(
vb − 1− Fb (vb)
fb (vb)
− vs − Fs (vs − 1)
fs (vs)
)
· fs (vs) · fb (vb)
=
m∑
vs=0
m∑
vb=vs
(
vb · fb (vb)− 1 + Fb (vb)
)
· fs (vs)−
m∑
vs=0
m∑
vb=vs
(
vs · fs (vs) + Fs (vs − 1)
)
· fb (vb)
=
m∑
vs=0
vs · fs (vs) ·
(
1− Fb (vs − 1)
)
−
m∑
vs=0
(
vs · fs (vs) + Fs (vs − 1)
)
·
(
1− Fb (vs − 1)
)
= −
m∑
vs=0
Fs (vs − 1) ·
(
1− Fb (vs − 1)
)
.
Hence, in this case we will always get a negative outcome and therefore q is not IIR-implementable
according to Theorem 5.1.
The above result is in line with the continuous case. The above quantity can be seen as the
lump-sum subsidy necessary to assure that an EPE implementable trading rules is IIR-feasible.
However, if qvs,vb = 0 for all valuations vs = vb, we obtain a slightly different result:
ub − ls
=
m∑
vs=0
m∑
vb=vs+1
(
vb − 1− Fb (vb)
fb (vb)
− vs − Fs (vs − 1)
fs (vs)
)
· fs (vs) · fb (vb)
=
m∑
vs=0
m∑
vb=vs+1
(
vb · fb (vb)− 1 + Fb (vb)
)
· fs (vs)−
m∑
vs=0
m∑
vb=vs+1
(
vs · fs (vs) + Fs (vs − 1)
)
· fb (vb)
=
m∑
vs=0
(vs + 1) · fs (vs) ·
(
1− Fb (vs)
)
−
m∑
vs=0
(
vs · fs (vs) + Fs (vs − 1)
)
·
(
1− Fb (vs)
)
= −
m∑
vs=0
(
− fs (vs) + Fs (vs − 1)
)
·
(
1− Fb (vs)
)
.
This expression need not be negative, even though it often will be.
Example. Consider the following setting: fi (vi) =
1
m+1 for all valuations vi for i = s, b and let
m = 4. The above expression then equals 0 and it can be checked that (q, t+, t−) is IC and EPIR,
where
t =
4 2 2 3 3 0
3 2 2 2 0 0
2 1 2 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 2 3 4
.
17
It can be checked that in the discrete uniform case for m > 4, any implementable trading rule is
not IIR-feasible and therefore also not EPIR-feasible. So only for small values of m we are able to
find EPE mechanisms that satisfy IC and EPIR.
7.2 Maximizing expected total gains from trade
The expected total gains from trade in a mechanism is
m∑
vs=0
Us (vs) · fs (vs) +
m∑
vb=0
Ub (vb) · fb (vb) =
m∑
vs=0
m∑
vb=0
(vb − vs) · qvs,vb · fs (vs) · fb (vb) .
Since ex post efficiency is, in most cases, unattainable (see Theorem 7.2), it is natural to seek for the
mechanism that maximizes the total expected gains from trade subject to incentive compatibility
and individual rationality. In order to find this mechanism, analogous to the terminology in Myerson
and Satterthwaite [1983] and Gresik [1991a], we define for every α ∈ [0, 1]:
qαvs,vb =
{
1 if vs + α
Fs(vs−1)
fs(vs)
≤ vb − α1−Fb(vb)fb(vb) ,
0 if vs + α
Fs(vs−1)
fs(vs)
> vb − α1−Fb(vb)fb(vb) .
The following theorem is analogous to Theorem 2 of Myerson and Satterthwaite [1983].
Theorem 7.3. If there exists an IC mechanism (q, t+, t−) such that Us(m) = Ub(0) = 0 and q = qα
for some α ∈ [0, 1], then this mechanism maximizes the expected total gains from trade among all
IC and IIR mechanisms.
8 Linear mechanisms
In this section we analyze are particular class of deterministic and comprehensive trading rules as
illustrative example. Assume that valuations are discrete uniformly distributed, that is fi (vi) =
1
m+1 for all valuations vi for i = s, b. Consider the following class of trading rules q with n ∈ N,
where n ≤ m,
m 1 1 . . . 1 1 0 . . . 0
m− 1 1 1 . . . 1 0 0 . . . 0
...
...
... . .
. ...
...
...
m− n+ 2 1 1 . . . 0 0 0 . . . 0
m− n+ 1 1 0 . . . 0 0 0 . . . 0
m− n 0 0 . . . 0 0 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 0 . . . 0 0 0 . . . 0
0 1 . . . n− 2 n− 1 n . . . m
.
In these trading rules n represents the largest number of opponent’s types with which a type has
trade (so the maximum amount of one’s in each row and column):
n = max
vs
(m+ 1) · q¯s (vs) = max
vb
(m+ 1) · q¯b (vb) .
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Then by the formula given in the previous section, we get the following values for the upper and
lower bounds of the expected transfer:
ls =
(n+ 1) · n · (n− 1)
3 · (m+ 1)2
us =
(2n+ 1) · (n+ 1) · n
6 · (m+ 1)2
lb =
(3m− 2n− 1) · (n+ 1) · n
6 · (m+ 1)2
ub =
(3m− 2n+ 2) · (n+ 1) · n
6 · (m+ 1)2 .
What should be noticed is that the length of both of the intervals between the upper and lower
bound (scaled in the proper way) is equal to (m + 1)2 · (us − ls) = (m + 1)2 · (ub − lb) = n·(n+1)2 .
This difference is equal to the total number of combinations of types for which trade occurs (total
number of one’s in our trading rule). The main question we want to answer is: for a given m ∈ N,
for which n is q EPIR-implementable? Distinguish the following three cases:
(i) If n > 34m + 1, we get that lb < ub < ls < us. From Theorem 5.1 we can conclude that q is
not IIR-implementable.
(ii) If n < 34m − 12 , we have that ls < us < lb < ub and hence according to Theorem 5.3 q is not
EPIR-implementable. However as ub > ls, according to theorem 5.1 it is possible to find a
(q, t+, t−) satisfying IC and IIR.
(iii) If 34m− 12 ≤ n ≤ 34m+ 1, there may exists a (q, t+, t−) satisfying IC and EPIR. In fact, such
mechanism exists. Namely, the mechanism (q, t+, t−), where
tvs,vb =
{(
vs + vb +
m
2
)
/3 if qvs,vb = 1,
0 else,
is both IC and EPIR.
8.1 Maximizing expected total gains from trade
From Subsection 7.2, we know which trading rule maximizes the total expected gains from trade:
qαvs,vb =
{
1 if vs ≤ vb − m·α1+α ,
0 if vs > vb − m·α1+α .
In order to find α, we need to use that Us(m) = Ub(0) = 0. Using Theorem 5.1, we get
0 ≤ ub − ls
=
m∑
vs=0
m∑
vb=0
2vb − 2vs −m
(m+ 1)2
· qαvs,vb
≤ m · (−1 + 3α) · (1 + α+m) · (2 + 2α+m)
6 · (1 + α)3 · (m+ 1)2 .
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Equality is assured by setting α = 13 . The trading rule solving this problem is
q
1
3
vs,vb =
{
1 if vs ≤ vb − m4 ,
0 if vs > vb − m4 ,
which is equivalent to the linear mechanism with n = 3m+44 . If we standardize this trading rule such
that all valuations are in between 0 and 1, we found the discrete version of the mechanism found
by Chatterjee and Samuelson [1983]. These results are in line with the results from Gresik [1991a],
saying that for a general set of beliefs there exists a transfer t such that the ex ante expected gains
from trade maximizing mechanism is IC and EPIR.
9 Conclusion
We provide an elaborate study of the bilateral trade model when having discrete valuations. Our
most important goal was to try to find a characterization of every trading rule that is EPIR-
feasible. We focus on ex post individual rationality as the majority of research on this topic does
not incorporate this stronger notion of individual rationality. Although potential buyers could be
hesitant to participate in a mechanism that can leave him worse of compared to what they begin
with. By using this stronger notion of individual rationality, we obtained the link between the sum
of minimum expected utilities and the expected transfer in a mechanism. An interesting question
for future research is to see what happens if we abandon the assumption of discrete uniformly
distributed valuations in order to find a more general characterization.
Another interesting topic is to analyze the setting in which the valuations are not independently
distributed. Although there is already some literature on this topic, it is still interesting to find
out whether efficiency can be restored and more importantly how.
A Appendix
In this Appendix, the reader will find proofs not given in the text and the remaining lemmas and
propositions.
Proof of Lemma 3.3. The “ only if” part is clear from the definition of IC.
For the “if” part it is shown by an inductive argument that if we assume WIC, a seller with a
valuation of vs does not want to misreport to a higher valuation. A similar argument shows that
no type of seller wants to deviate to a lower valuation, meaning that the mechanism is incentive
compatible for the seller. In an analogous way, it is possible to prove that the mechanism will also
be incentive compatible for the buyer.
We will show by induction that Us (vs) ≥ Us (rs, vs) for every report rs > vs. Pick an arbitrary
valuation vs for vs = 0, . . . ,m−1 and some arbitrary report rs > vs and assume WIC. For the base
case notice that if rs = vs + 1, WIC directly implies that Us (vs) ≥ Us (vs + 1, vs).
For the induction step, we need to prove that if Us (vs) ≥ Us (rs, vs) for vs < rs < m, then it
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must also hold that Us (vs) ≥ Us (rs + 1, vs). Observe that the following holds due to WIC:
Us (rs) ≥ Us (rs + 1, rs)
= t¯s (rs + 1)− rs · q¯s (rs + 1)
= Us (rs + 1) + q¯s (rs + 1)
≥ Us (rs, rs + 1) + q¯s (rs + 1)
= t¯s (rs)− (rs + 1) · q¯s (rs) + q¯s (rs + 1)
= Us (rs)− q¯s (rs) + q¯s (rs + 1)
and thus we can conclude that
q¯s (rs) ≥ q¯s (rs + 1) . (8)
So if we assume that Us (vs) ≥ Us (rs, vs), we have
Us (vs) ≥ Us (rs, vs)
= t¯s (rs)− vs · q¯s (rs)
= Us (rs) + (rs − vs) · q¯s (vs)
≥ Us (rs + 1, rs) + (rs − vs) · q¯s (rs)
= t¯s (rs + 1)− rs · q¯s (rs + 1) + (rs − vs) · q¯s (rs)
≥ t¯s (rs + 1)− rs · q¯s (rs + 1) + (rs − vs) · q¯s (rs + 1)
= t¯s (rs + 1)− vs · q¯s (rs + 1)
= Us (rs + 1, vs) ,
where the third inequality follows from inequality (8) and the fact that vs < rs.
The following lemma describes the expected utility of each type of player in a IC mechanism.
Lemma A.1. If the direct mechanism (q, t+, t−) is IC. Then for all valuations vs < rs and vb > rb
Us (rs) +
rs∑
vi=vs+1
q¯s (vi) ≤ Us (vs) ≤ Us (rs) +
rs−1∑
vi=vs
q¯s (vi) (9)
Ub (rb) +
vb−1∑
vj=rb
q¯b (vj) ≤ Ub (vb) ≤ Ub (rb) +
vb∑
vj=rb+1
q¯b (vj) . (10)
Proof. Let us prove the left inequality of (9). The rest can be proven analogously.
We prove by induction that for vs < rs ≤ m:
Us (vs)− Us (rs) ≥
rs∑
vi=vs+1
q¯s (vi) .
For the base case rs = vs + 1, we get from WIC that
Us (vs)− Us (vs + 1) ≥ Us (vs + 1, vs)− Us (vs + 1)
= t¯s (vs + 1)− vs · q¯s (vs + 1)−
(
t¯s (vs + 1)− (vs + 1) · q¯s (vs + 1)
)
= q¯s (vs + 1) .
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Now assume that the induction step holds for rs < m, then
Us (vs)− Us (rs + 1) = Us (vs)− Us (rs) + Us (rs)− Us (rs + 1)
≥
rs∑
vi=vs+1
q¯s (vi) + q¯s (rs + 1)
=
rs+1∑
vi=vs+1
q¯s (vi) ,
which proves the inequality for rs + 1.
Proof of Lemma 3.5. Let us prove equality (1):
ub − ls
=
m∑
vb=1
vb∑
vj=1
vj ·
(
q¯b (vj)− q¯b (vj − 1)
)
· fb (vb)
−
m−1∑
vs=0
m−1∑
vi=vs
(
vi ·
(
q¯s (vi)− q¯s (vi + 1)
)
+m · q¯s (m)
)
· fs (vs)−m · q¯s (m) · fs(m)
=
m∑
vb=1
− vb−1∑
vj=0
q¯b (vj) + vb · q¯b (vb)
 · fb (vb)− m−1∑
vs=0
(
vs · q¯s (vs) +
m∑
vi=vs+1
q¯s (vi)
)
· fs (vs)−m · q¯s (m) · fs(m)
=
m∑
vb=0
(
vb − 1− Fb (vb)
fb (vb)
)
· q¯b (vj) · fb (vb)−
m∑
vs=0
(
vs +
Fs (vs − 1)
fs (vs)
)
· q¯s (vi) · fs (vs)
=
m∑
vs=0
m∑
vb=0
(
vb − 1− Fb (vb)
fb (vb)
− vs − Fs (vs − 1)
fs (vs)
)
· qvs,vb · fs (vs) · fb (vb) .
Proof of Lemma 3.6. In order to find that Us (m) + Ub (0) ≤ ub − ls, we rewrite the following
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expression:
m∑
vs=0
m∑
vb=0
(vb − vs) · qvs,vb · fs (vs) · fb (vb)
=
m∑
vs=0
m∑
vb=0
(
tvs,vb · fb (vb)− vs · qvs,vb · fb (vb)
)
· fs (vs) +
m∑
vb=0
m∑
vs=0
(
vb · qvs,vb · fs (vs)− tvs,vb · fs (vs)
)
· fb (vb)
=
m∑
vs=0
Us (vs) · fs (vs) +
m∑
vb=0
Ub (vb) · fb (vb)
≥
m∑
vs=0
(
Us (m) +
m∑
vi=vs+1
q¯s (vi)
)
· fs (vs) +
m∑
vb=0
Ub (0) + vb−1∑
vj=0
q¯b (vj)
 · fb (vb)
= Us (m) +
m∑
vs=0
m∑
vi=vs+1
q¯s (vi) · fs (vs) + Ub (0) +
m∑
vb=0
vb−1∑
vj=0
q¯b (vj) · fb (vb)
= Us (m) + Ub (0) +
m∑
vs=0
q¯s (vs) · Fs (vs − 1) +
m∑
vb=0
q¯b (vb) ·
(
1− Fb (vb)
)
= Us (m) + Ub (0) +
m∑
vs=0
m∑
vb=0
(
Fs (vs − 1) · fb (vb) +
(
1− Fb (vb)
)
· fs (vs)
)
· qvs,vb ,
where the inequality uses Lemma A.1 in the Appendix by setting rs = m and rb = 0. Rearranging
the first and last term of these expressions leads to the desired inequality. In a similar way of
rearranging and using the other inequalities of Lemma A.1, we obtain the left inequality of this
lemma.
The following properties hold for an EPIR mechanism.
Proposition A.2. Let the direct mechanism (q, t+, t−) be EPIR. Then every t defined by (t+, t−)
satisfies:
(a) 0 ≤ tvs,vb ≤ m
(b) if vs > vb, then qvs,vb = 0
(c) if qvs,vb = 0, then tvs,vb = 0
(d) t¯s(m) = m · q¯s(m)
(e) t¯b(0) = 0.
Proof. By the definition of EPIR, we have that for all possible valuations vs and vb
vs · qvs,vb ≤ tvs,vb ≤ vb · qvs,vb . (11)
Observe that (11) directly implies (a), (b) and (c).
In order to prove (d), see that (11) assures that tm,m = m · qm,m. Also notice from property
(b) that qm,0 = . . . = qm,m−1 = 0. Hence q¯s(m) = qm,m and by (c) it holds that t¯s(m) = tm,m. In
conclusion, we find that indeed t¯s(m) = m · q¯s(m).
23
As last for (e), conclude from (11) that t0,0 = 0 and notice from (b) that q1,0 = . . . = qm,0 = 0.
So by (c) it holds that t¯b(0) = t0,0 and hence t¯b(0) = 0.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Let us first proof the “only if” part. Assume q is IIR-implementable. By
Lemma 3.4, we know that q¯s(·) is weakly decreasing and q¯b(·) is weakly increasing. For every
(q, t+, t−) satisfying IC and IIR, we know by Lemma 3.6 that Us (m) + Ub (0) ≤ ub − ls and we
know that IIR assures that Us (m) ≥ 0 and Ub (0) ≥ 0. Combined this means that inequality (3)
needs to hold.
In order to complete the “if part” of the proof, suppose that q¯s(·) is weakly decreasing, q¯b(·) is
weakly increasing and q satisfies (3). We will construct a t such that for every (t+, t−) defining this
t, we have that (q, t+, t−) satisfies IC and IIR:
tvs,vb =
vb∑
vj=1
vj ·
(
q¯b (vj)− q¯b (vj − 1)
)
−
vs−1∑
vi=0
vi ·
(
q¯s (vi)− q¯s (vi + 1)
)
+
m−1∑
vi=0
vi ·
(
1− Fs (vi)
)
·
(
q¯s (vi)− q¯s (vi + 1)
)
.
Let us show that (q, t+, t−) indeed satisfies IC and IIR. Notice that all the three sums on the right-
hand side are nonnegative, due to our assumptions on q¯s(·) and q¯b(·). The first term is chosen so
that (q, t+, t−) satisfies incentive compatibility for the buyer, the second term is chosen to satisfy
incentive compatibility for the seller and the last term is chosen in such a way that (q, t+, t−)
satisfies Ub(0) = 0 and Us(m) ≥ 0. Once we prove these properties, it will follow from Lemma 3.4
that (q, t+, t−) also satisfies IIR.
To check incentive compatibility for the seller, observe that for types rs > vs
Us (vs)− Us (rs, vs)
= t¯s (vs)− vs · q¯s (vs)−
(
t¯s (rs)− vs · q¯s (rs)
)
= t¯s (vs)− t¯s (rs)− vs ·
(
q¯s (vs)− q¯s (rs)
)
=
m∑
vb=0
rs−1∑
vi=0
vi ·
(
q¯s (vi)− q¯s (vi + 1)
)
· fb (vb)−
m∑
vb=0
vs−1∑
vi=0
vi ·
(
q¯s (vi)− q¯s (vi + 1)
)
· fb (vb)
− vs ·
(
q¯s (vs)− q¯s (rs)
)
=
rs−1∑
vi=vs
vi ·
(
q¯s (vi)− q¯s (vi + 1)
)
−
rs−1∑
vi=vs
vs ·
(
q¯s (vi)− q¯s (vi + 1)
)
≥ 0
and for types rs < vs
Us (vs)− Us (rs, vs) = −
vs−1∑
vi=rs
vi ·
(
q¯s (vi)− q¯s (vi + 1)
)
+
vs−1∑
vi=rs
vs ·
(
q¯s (vi)− q¯s (vi + 1)
)
≥ 0.
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A similar analysis can be conducted to prove incentive compatibility for the buyer. To check IIR,
note that
Ub(0)
= −
m∑
vs=0
tvs,0 · fs (vs)
=
m∑
vs=0
vs−1∑
vi=0
vi ·
(
q¯s (vi)− q¯s (vi + 1)
)
· fs (vs)−
m∑
vs=0
m−1∑
vi=0
vi ·
(
1− Fs (vi)
)
·
(
q¯s (vi)− q¯s (vi + 1)
)
· fs (vs)
=
m∑
vs=1
vs−1∑
vi=0
vi ·
(
q¯s (vi)− q¯s (vi + 1)
)
· fs (vs)−
m−1∑
vi=0
vi ·
(
1− Fs (vi)
)
·
(
q¯s (vi)− q¯s (vi + 1)
)
=
m−1∑
vi=0
vi ·
(
1− Fs (vi)
)
·
(
q¯s (vi)− q¯s (vi + 1)
)
−
m−1∑
vi=0
vi ·
(
1− Fs (vi)
)
·
(
q¯s (vi)− q¯s (vi + 1)
)
= 0
and
Us(m)
=
m∑
vb=0
tm,vb · fb (vb)−m · q¯s (m)
=
m∑
vb=0
(
vb∑
vj=1
vj ·
(
q¯b (vj)− q¯b (vj − 1)
)
−
m−1∑
vi=0
vi ·
(
q¯s (vi)− q¯s (vi + 1)
)
+
m−1∑
vi=0
vi ·
(
1− Fs (vi)
)
·
(
q¯s (vi)− q¯s (vi + 1)
))
· fb (vb)−m · q¯s (m)
=
m∑
vb=1
vb∑
vj=1
vj ·
(
q¯b (vj)− q¯b (vj − 1)
)
· fb (vb)−
m−1∑
vi=0
vi · Fs (vi) ·
(
q¯s (vi)− q¯s (vi + 1)
)
−m · q¯s (m)
= ub −
m−1∑
vs=0
(
vs · q¯s (vs) +
m∑
vi=vs+1
q¯s (vi)
)
· fs (vs)−m · q¯s (m) · fs(m)
= ub −
m−1∑
vs=0
m−1∑
vi=vs
(
vi ·
(
q¯s (vi)− q¯s (vi + 1)
)
+m · q¯s (m)
)
· fs (vs)−m · q¯s (m) · fs(m)
= ub − ls
≥ 0.
Proof of Theorem 6.2. Let us show that (q, t+, t−) satisfies IIR and WIC for the seller. What
should be noted is that for each type vs < m, we have that
t¯s (vs) =
m−1∑
vi=vs
(vi + ∆s) ·
(
q¯s (vi)− q¯s (vi + 1)
)
+m · q¯s(m) ≥ 0.
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Also for each vs and vs + 1, we have that
t¯s (vs)− t¯s (vs + 1) = (vs + ∆s)
(
q¯s (vs)− q¯s (vs + 1)
)
.
Since 0 ≤ ∆s ≤ 1, the mechanism (q, t+, t−) is WIC and IIR for the seller.
It only remains to show that (q, t+, t−) satisfies IIR and IC for the buyer. For each type of
buyer vb > 0, we have that
t¯b (vb) =
vb∑
vi=1
(vi − 1 + ∆b) ·
(
q¯b (vi)− q¯b (vi − 1)
)
≥ 0.
Then for each type of buyer vb and
vb−1
m , it holds that
t¯b (vb)− t¯b (vb − 1) = (vb − 1 + ∆b)
(
q¯b (vb)− q¯b (vb − 1)
)
.
Since 0 ≤ ∆b ≤ 1, the mechanism is WIC and IIR for the buyer. As the mechanism satisfies WIC
for both the seller and the buyer, according to Lemma 3.3 it also satisfies IC. Hence we have shown
that the above payment matrix assures that the mechanism is IIR, IC and has only nonzero prices
if there is trade.
Proof of Lemma 6.3. Let (tT+, tT−) denote the transfer for the transposed trading rule. Define
tT− = 0 and
tT+vs,vb =
{
m− tm−vb,m−vs if qm−vb,m−vs = 1.
0 if qm−vb,m−vs = 0.
We show that if (q, t+, t−) satisfies IC and EPIR, then (qT , tT+, tT−) also satisfies IC and EPIR.
Assume that (q, t+, t−) satisfies IC and EPIR. By construction, (qT , tT+, tT−) is EPIR. Thus it
remains to show that (qT , tT+, tT−) is WIC and therefore IC. Let UTs (vs) denote the expected
utility of the seller in the transposed mechanism. We show that UTs (vs) ≥ UTs (vs + 1, vs) for every
vs = 0, . . . ,m− 1. The inequality for the other deviation direction and the proof for the buyer can
be conducted in a similar fashion. First, observe that for every vs:
q¯Ts (vs) = q¯b (m− vs) .
Then, notice that
t¯Ts (vs) =
m∑
vb=0
tTvs,vb ·
1
m+ 1
=
m∑
vb=0
(m− tm−vb,m−vs) · qm−vb,m−vs ·
1
m+ 1
= m · q¯b (m− vs)− t¯b (m− vs)
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and thus
UTs (vs) = t¯
T
s (vs)− vs · q¯Ts (vs)
= (m− vs) · q¯b (m− vs)− t¯b (m− vs)
= Ub (m− vs)
≥ Ub (m− (vs + 1),m− vs)
= (m− vs) · q¯b (m− (vs + 1))− t¯b (m− (vs + 1))
= t¯Ts (vs + 1)− vs · q¯Ts (vs + 1)
= UTs (vs + 1, vs) .
The following lemma presents necessary and sufficient conditions for corner mechanisms to be
EPIR-implementable.
Lemma A.3. Assume fi (vi) =
1
m+1 for all valuations vi for i = s, b and let q be a corner matrix
with k > 0 and ` > 0. Then q is EPIR-implementable if and only if there exist x, y, z ∈ R satisfying
k · (m− 1) ≤ z + k · x− y ≤ k ·m (12)
0 ≤ z + ` · y − x ≤ ` (13)
k ≤ x ≤ k + 1− qm,m (14)
m− `− 1 + q0,0 ≤ y ≤ m− ` (15)
0 ≤ z ≤ m. (16)
Proof. To prove the ”only if” part, assume that q is EPIR-implementable. WIC for the seller implies
that 0 ≤
m∑
vb=m−l
t0,vb − t1,m ≤ l and that t1,m = t2,m = . . . = tk,m. If k < m, then WIC implies
that k ≤ tk,m ≤ k + 1 or else if k = m EPIR implies that tm,m = m. In a similar way of reasoning
we can conclude that k · (m − 1) ≤
k∑
vs=0
tvs,m − t0,m−1 ≤ k ·m, t0,m−1 = . . . = t0,m−`+1 = t0,m−l
and that m − ` − 1 ≤ t0,m−` ≤ m − ` if 0 ≤ ` < m or t0,0 = 0 if ` = m. If we then let x = t1,m,
y = t0,m−1 and z = t0,m, we end up with the inequalities mentioned in the Lemma.
For the ”if part” assume there exists a x, y and z satisfying the inequalities. Set t1,m = . . . =
tk,m = x, t0,m−` = . . . = t0,m−1 = y and t0,m = z. Clearly, due to the constraints on x, y and z
these prices will satisfy WIC and thus IC. Furthermore, since 0 ≤ k ≤ x ≤ k + 1 − qm,m ≤ m,
0 ≤ m− `− 1 + q0,0 ≤ y ≤ m− ` ≤ m and 0 ≤ z ≤ m these prices will also satisfy EPIR.
Proof of Theorem 7.3. We want to find a q that maximizes
m∑
vs=0
m∑
vb=0
(vb − vs) · qvs,vb · fs (vs) · fb (vb)
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subject to constraint (3): ls ≤ ub. Setting up the Lagrangian:
L (vs, vb, λ)
=
m∑
vs=0
m∑
vb=0
(
vb + λ ·
(
vb − 1− Fb (vb)
fb (vb)
)
− vs − λ ·
(
vs +
Fs (vs − 1)
fs (vs)
))
· qvs,vb · fs (vs) · fb (vb)
= (1 + λ) ·
m∑
vs=0
m∑
vb=0
(
vb − λ
1 + λ
1− Fb (vb)
fb (vb)
− vs − λ
1 + λ
Fs (vs − 1)
fs (vs)
)
· qvs,vb · fs (vs) · fb (vb) .
This Lagrangian is maximized by qα with α = λ1+λ . We know that for q
α, q¯s(·) is weakly decreasing
and q¯b(·) is weakly increasing. Furthermore, since Us(m) = Ub(0) = 0 we know due to Lemma 3.6
that ls ≤ ub and thus we can conclude from Theorem 5.1 that qα is IIR-implementable.
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